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Abstract: The thirty-year post-World War II boom in Australia has been described as the era 
of the antipodean Fordist model of development. Key to the functioning of this model is a 
‘lead sector’, an industry or industries that are the source of wage and conditions 
improvements that subsequently flow-on to workers in the broader labour force. In Australia, 
the metal trades sector executed this vital function. This article explores the path by which 
this sector, governed by the Metal Trades Award, became juridically institutionalised as a 
pace-setter in the practices and methodology of the federal arbitral tribunal between 1947 and 
1963. Focussing on several key decisions fixing payments for skill in awards, so-called 
‘margins’, it will be seen that, by a process of evolution, the metal trades sector came to 
dominate marginal wage fixation, and was construed by the federal tribunal as a proxy for the 
economy at large. In plotting the process by which this lead sector principle took root, the 
article also reveals a differentiation of this principle into a ‘passive’ and ‘active’ facet.  
Keywords: Metal Trades Award, regulation approach, arbitration, lead sector, Fordism 
‘In the past, the Metal Trades Award (up to 1971) was the key central award in practically 
every area of wage fixation – the old story of the fitter’s rate as the yardstick.’1 
Speaking in 1972, the Victorian State Secretary of the Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union 
John Halfpenny echoed sentiments prevalent in the early to mid-1970s – an understanding 
that the Metal Trades Award was of vital importance to the Australian wage structure, but 
                                                          
 The author is grateful to the anonymous peer reviewers for their constructive comments. Thanks are also due 
to Michael Rawling, James Dahlstrom and Yvonne Apolo for reviewing the manuscript. 
1 Tribune, 21 November 1972, 6. 
2 
  
that this significance was waning, perhaps irrevocably.2 The economic crisis and stagnation 
of the 1970s, followed by the profound structural transformations in the wage structure 
wrought by the Accords in the 1980s, meant that workers and their unions never really got 
the opportunity to study just what that significance was and how it had been achieved. 
This article is intended to answer these questions from the perspective of the juridical. It 
briefly explores the prehistory of the metal trades industries and the compulsory arbitration 
system in the first half of the twentieth century before explaining the post-World War II 
evolution of the relationship between the two, crystallised in the Metal Trades Award. In 
particular, this article explores how the metal trades came to be institutionally embedded as a 
‘lead sector’ within the framework of antipodean Fordism, the particular epoch of capitalism 
that provided the foundations of the thirty-year post-World War II boom in Australia. Such a 
model presupposes a particular sector or sectors that exhibit higher than normal productivity, 
within which workers can achieve wage and conditions outcomes that ‘flow-on’ to other 
sections of the labour force. Such an arrangement, mirrored in other Fordist states, has been 
conceptualised by Boyer as a system of ‘connective bargaining.’3  
Building upon earlier work, this article deploys a model of legal analysis formed by a 
conceptual synthesis of the Parisian Regulation Approach (PRA) and a theory of law as a 
juridic form of capitalist social relations.4 Whilst based on a materialist understanding of 
history, such a perspective presupposes that law is not a mere epiphenomenal superstructure, 
but is instead an inherent, deeply implanted feature of particular epochs of capitalism.5 
Employing this method, we can trace how the economic positioning of the metal trades as a 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Metal Trades in Australian Industrial Law Review 13(14) (1971): ¶278; Metal Industry 
Award in Australian Industrial Law Review 16(23) (1974): ¶565; Canberra Times, 12 September 1974, 1. 
3 Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 
x. 
4 Brett Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism: Rethinking Social Justice and Labour Law 
(London & New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017). 
5 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 29-42. 
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lead sector was matched by its juridic positioning at the apex of the award structure. 
Focussing particularly on the key issue of marginal wage fixation, this article closely 
examines several vital federal arbitral tribunal decisions from 1947-1963. This analysis is 
based upon a cursory timeline previously created by the author,6 but reaches deeper into the 
decisions themselves, revealing with much greater granularity the law fulfilling one of its key 
abstract functions within the antipodean Fordist model of development; the entrenchment of 
the lead sector and the creation of the institutionalised channels through which its wage and 
conditions outcomes could flow. Such a reality demonstrates the integral role that law plays 
in a functioning model of development and the utility of the PRA/juridic forms model of 
legal evolution. 
In order to ground this analysis, however, it is first necessary to elucidate its theoretical 
framework. 
Theoretical Framework 
The Parisian Regulation Approach, the radical political-economic approach to studying 
capitalism on which this article is based, is premised on the materialist conception of history, 
arguably Marx and Engels greatest contribution to social science. Although proponents of 
this ground-breaking method of historical study have spilled much ink over differing 
interpretations of its content and constituent concepts, the core of historical materialism is 
easy to grasp. Blackledge notes that ‘[t]hroughout his life Marx insisted that it was 
production, understood as a social, political and historical process, that was at the centre of 
the social totality.’7  
                                                          
6 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 131-136. 
7 Paul Blackledge, Reflections on the Marxist theory of history (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2006), 22. 
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Seen from this perspective of totality, there are certain regularities in the forces and relations 
of production that allow us to speak of particular modes of production, such as the feudal and 
capitalist modes of production, and to periodise history in terms of the ascendancy, decline 
and transitions between different modes.8 What the historical materialist method reveals is 
that forms of the state, cultural institutions and, most importantly for our purposes, law – all 
of these structures can only be rigorously explained in the context of the modes of production 
of which they are part. 
Applied in the study of law, the materialist method can offer a powerful account of law and 
the legal form ‘as a social institution with its roots deeply embedded within, and constitutive 
of, capitalist relations of production and exchange.’9 As opposed to the idealist notion that the 
driving force of legal development is abstract ideas, ‘materialist jurisprudence is concerned 
with the social and economic forces directing the course of legal development.’10 In so doing, 
it offers a truly historical conception of law, conceiving it as an institution imbued with its 
own motive force whilst being at the same time tied to the broader development of the social 
relations underpinning modes of production. 
A particularly useful current of materialist jurisprudence (especially in terms of addressing 
some alleged shortcomings, such as abstraction and economic reductionism)11 is that work 
drawing upon the concepts and methodology of the PRA.12 PRA scholars seek to understand 
how capitalism, despite its immanent tendencies towards crisis, can nevertheless reproduce 
                                                          
8 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1904), 
11-13. 
9 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 31. 
10 Anthony Chase, Law and History: The Evolution of the American Legal System (New York: The New Press, 
1997), 20. 
11 Space precludes us from dealing with these here. For a useful overview, see Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). 
12 See, for example, Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism; Brett Heino, ‘Trading hours 
deregulation in Tasmania and Western Australia: large retailer dominance and changing models of 
development,’ Labour & Industry 27(2) (2017): 95-112; Brett Christophers, The Great Leveler: Capitalism and 
Competition in the Court of Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
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itself and at times achieve periods of stability and sustained growth. Growing out of structural 
Marxism in the late 1970s, the PRA was a response to the inadequacies of orthodox Marxist 
thought in explaining the post-World War II “Golden Age” or “Long Boom,” which 
combined high and stable growth, full employment, and rising wages won by an 
institutionally entrenched labour movement.13 Clearly, despite the contradictory character of 
capitalist social relations (expressed in such phenomena as the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall, crisis of overproduction and working-class underconsumption), capitalism could 
function more-or-less smoothly for periods of time. The question, as Boyer simply put it, was 
‘how can such a contradictory process succeed over a long period of time?’14 
The answer lay in the notion of ‘regulation’, the process by which ‘[c]apital accumulation 
could be guided and regularised through a contingent, historically variant combination of 
economic and extra-economic factors in a distinctive institutional matrix, handling, to 
varying degrees, the different crisis tendencies of capitalist social relations.’15 Expressed 
differently, combinations of economic and political institutions could together temporarily 
ameliorate, displace or defer the crisis tendencies inbuilt into capitalism’s DNA. 
These regularities allow us to speak of epochs of capitalism, or ‘models of development,’ 
more-or-less stable instantiations of the capitalist mode of production combining: 
 An industrial paradigm, governing the social and technical division of labour;16 
                                                          
13 For a useful account of the intellectual and historical origins of the PRA, see Alain Lipietz, ‘From 
Althusserianism to “Regulation Theory”,’ in The Althusserian Legacy, ed. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinkler 
(London & New York: Verso, 1993), 99-138. 
14 Boyer, The Regulation School, 34. 
15 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 12. 




 An accumulation regime, a stable combination of capital’s economic forms that 
synchronises production and consumption;17 and 
 A mode of regulation, ‘a concrete hierarchy of capital’s juridic forms, the extra-
economic struts that allow capital to move through its circuit’.18 
For regulationists, the model of development which undergirded the post-World War II Long 
Boom was Fordism. This article follows Lipietz’s characterisation of this model of 
development as combining a Taylorist, mechanised industrial paradigm with a mass 
production/mass consumption accumulation regime and a mode of regulation centred on a 
redistributive welfare state.19 The results of this synthesis could broadly be described as an 
articulation between rising productivity and real wages, full employment and profound state 
intervention in the economy, resulting in high and sustained rates of growth. 
Within the regulationist corpus there is much work to suggest that for this Fordist model of 
development to succeed, certain ‘lead sectors’ were required,20 sectors which are strongly 
representative of the dominant industrial paradigm, exhibit higher levels of productivity than 
other sectors, and are thus in a position to cascade wage and conditions improvements 
                                                          
17 Bob Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach: Critical reflections on the contradictions, dilemmas, fixes 
and crisis dynamics of growth regimes,’ Capital & Class 37(1) (2013): 8; Heino, Regulation Theory and 
Australian Capitalism, 15. 
18 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 16. 
19 Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1992), 3-7. 
20 This is not to suggest that such sectors arose and performed some pre-ordained historical role mechanistically. 
The fact that lead sectors were required in order to generate a Fordist dynamic was no guarantee that they would 
or could exercise that function. Such a role is often only discernible after the fact, and is almost invariably 
accompanied by struggle between different social forces. For example, as will be intimated in this article, it was 
the militant efforts of metal unions to universalise their gains that helped in part create the lead sector principle. 
However, it remains the case that the creation of a lead sector dynamic is an important element of Fordism, a 
point that can be validated empirically by its prevalence within Fordist societies e.g. steelworkers in Sweden, the 
automobile industry in the USA, consumer durables in South Africa, metals in West Germany etc. See, 
respectively, Scott Lash, ‘The End of Neo-corporatism?: The Breakdown of Centralised Bargaining in Sweden,’ 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 23(2) (1985): 218; John Krinsky, ‘Neoliberal Times: Intersecting 
Temporalities and the Neoliberalization of New York City's Public-Sector Labor Relations,’ Social Science 
History 35(3) (2011): 391; Christian M. Rogerson, ‘Beyond Racial Fordism: Restructuring Industry in the 
‘New’ South Africa,’ Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie 82(5) (1991): 356; Lucio Baccaro and 
Chris Howell, Trajectories of Neoliberal Transformation: European Industrial Relations Since the 1970s 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 100-101. 
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throughout the labour force (provided there are suitable institutional supports in place).21 This 
is the basis of the broader formulation of lead sectors as ‘industries in which outcomes 
disproportionately affect industrial, economic and social outcomes in other industries…’22  
According to Krätke, Fordism ‘was shaped by a focus on mass production technologies and 
the rise of “medium high-tech” manufacturing industries such as the automotive industry…’23 
Presented in a stylised way, the role of lead sectors within the Fordist model of development 
was to be the font of wage and conditions standards which would percolate through the 
economy, generating the high levels of effective demand and relatively homogenous wage 
structure that ensured the coherence of that model.24  
When pitched at this level of abstraction, however, the model of development concept, 
including Fordism, is best conceived as an ideal-type, a logical, as opposed to strictly 
historical, construction. It serves as a focussing device, a lens through which we can obtain an 
abstract outline of causal relationships to guide an investigation into the actual flesh-and-
blood structure of post–World War II advanced capitalist states, including Australia. In order 
to fulfil its analytical potential, the Fordist model of development has to be sensitised to 
particular concrete contexts. This process of sensitisation has been undertaken elsewhere, the 
result of which has been the notion of antipodean Fordism, an Australian variant of the 
Fordist ideal-type (stretching from 1945 until the early 1970s) that exhibited a distinctive 
                                                          
21 See, for example, Michel De Vroey, ‘A regulation approach interpretation of contemporary crisis,’ Capital & 
Class 8(2) (1984): 55-56; Bob Jessop, ‘Fordism and Post-Fordism: A critical reformulation,’ in Pathways to 
Industrialization and Regional Development, ed. Michael Storper and Allen J. Scott (London: Routledge, 1992), 
43-65. 
22 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 48. 
23 Stefan Kräke, The Creative Capital of Cities: Interactive Knowledge Creation and the Urbanization 
Economies of Innovation (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 17. 
24 Robert Boyer, ‘Wage formation in historical perspective: the French experience,’ Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 3(2) (1979): 115-116. 
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industrial paradigm, accumulation regime and mode of regulation, which in concert 
established unique modalities of coherence and distinctive trajectories of crisis.25 
Of particular note in this regard is the antipodean Fordist mode of regulation, in particular 
one of its constituent elements, the so-called wage-labour nexus, the set of legal and 
institutional conditions governing the terms of wage-labour.26 Born of the Great Depression 
and its ruinous underconsumption, Fordism’s wage-labour nexus repositioned wages as a 
source of domestic demand (rather than simply a cost of production) and entrenched 
moderate trade unionism, which obtained increased wages for workers at the cost of deeper 
real subordination to managerial prerogative in the organisation of the labour process.27 The 
legal premises of this wage-labour nexus include, ‘…those that allowed for the diffusion of 
wage increases from high-productivity ‘lead sectors’; permitted collective and ‘connective’ 
bargaining; encouraged the organisation of labour; and developed a notion of the ‘standard’, 
full-time employment contract’ (emphasis added).28 In other words, central to the antipodean 
Fordist wage-labour nexus was precisely the juridical crystallisation of the lead sector 
principle. Within the labour law regime of antipodean Fordism, therefore, we should see legal 
institutions creating and maintaining a relatively compressed wage structure dominated by a 
lead sector.  
Extending this insight further, we can also state a priori that there are two facets which this 
lead sector principle might exhibit juridically, what is referred to in this article as its ‘passive’ 
and ‘active’ sense (an important conceptual distinction/innovation not apparent in the 
                                                          
25 See, for example, Brett Heino and James Dahlstrom, ‘‘War Crimes and the Parisian Régulation 
Approach: Representations of the Crisis of Antipodean Fordism,’ Journal of Australian Political Economy 74 
(2014/15): 95–117; Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism. 
26 Robert Boyer, ‘Perspectives on the wage-labour nexus,’ in Régulation Theory: The State of the Art, ed. Robert 
Boyer and Yves Saillard (London: Routledge, 2002), 73-74. 
27 Jessop, ‘Revisiting the regulation approach,’ 14; David Neilson, ‘Formal and real subordination nd the 
contemporary proletariat: Re-coupling Marxist class theory and labour-process analysis,’ Capital & Class 31(1) 
(2007): 102-103. 
28 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 54-55. 
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author’s earlier treatment of this subject).29 The passive sense of the lead sector principle 
would involve a recognition on the part of key industrial relations institutions that the lead 
sector determines in fact outcomes in other industries, an understanding that then informs the 
practice of those institutions. By contrast, the more active facet of the lead sector principle 
would see such institutions explicitly establishing channels to encourage and facilitate flow-
on from lead sectors to other regions of the economy. 
If we study Australia during the take-off and coherence of antipodean Fordism i.e. from after 
World War II until the early 1970s, we indeed see the juridical institutionalisation of a lead 
sector, exhibiting both passive and active facets (though not evenly, as will be established). 
The legal institutions: the highly unique structure of compulsory conciliation and arbitration, 
a system of independent, quasi-judicial tribunals that could compulsorily determine disputes, 
with the resultant determinations regarded as enforceable ‘awards’ regulating the wages and 
working conditions for groups of workers.30 The lead sector: the metal trades, to which we 
now turn. 
The Metal Trades – A Fordist Lead Sector 
Before tracing the juridic history of the metal trades and its positioning at the apex of the 
award hierarchy, it is necessary to note briefly just what is meant by the label ‘metal trades’. 
Such a task is by no means straight forward, particularly in the Australian context. As a 
starting point, sub-industries typically thought of as constituting the metal trades include 
basic metals, metal fabrication, and machinery and transport equipment construction.31 These 
industries were strongholds of the key unions associated with the Metal Trades Award, 
                                                          
29 Heino, Regulation Theory and Australian Capitalism, 131-136. 
30 For more on the essential features of the arbitral model (shared only by Australia and New Zealand), see 
Gordon Anderson and Michael Quinlan, ‘The Changing Role of the State: Regulating Work in 
Australia and New Zealand 1788-2007,’ Labour History 95 (2008): 122-123. 
31 See, for example, the classifications used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 
(Canberra: 1976), 280-281.  
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including the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the Australasian Society of 
Engineers, the Federated Moulders Union of Australasia, the Blacksmiths’ Society of 
Australasia, the Sheet Metal Working Agricultural Implement & Stove Making Industrial 
Union of Australia and the Federated Ironworkers Association. Such bodies were at the 
forefront of the marginal wage cases explored below. 
However, it is significant to note that, unlike the experience of many European states such as 
Austria and Sweden,32 wage fixation in Australia during the Fordist period exhibited a 
strongly occupationally-based character. This meant that certain awards such as the Metal 
Trades Award, although expressed to cover a particular industry, actually had a far wider 
application. For example, regardless of the nature of the workplace within which one was 
employed, if a worker was carrying out the functions of the general engineering fitter in the 
metal award (a classification we will come to know well in this article), they would be 
covered by that instrument. As fitters were found throughout the industrial structure, it meant 
that the metal award could apply to, and concomitantly draw upon, workers in a great many 
industries.33 
Alongside this occupational-bent, the Australian system of arbitration, and the award pyramid 
it constructed, was regulated by the notion of ‘comparative wage justice’, the idea that 
‘employees doing the same work for different employers or in different industries should by 
and large receive the same amount of pay irrespective of the capacity of their employer or 
industry.’34 Awards existed in a complex, variegated hierarchy, with certain awards sharing 
historical nexus with others and possessing well-defined relativities in terms of pay 
                                                          
32 Torben Iversen, ‘Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: Denmark and 
Sweden in Comparative Perspective,’ Comparative Politics 28(4) (1996): 401. 
33 Tom Sheridan, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920-1972 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), 22. 
34 Oil Industry Case (1970) 134 CAR 159, 165.   
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differentials between classifications. Unions jealously guarded ‘their’ awards and the 
established relativities, such that movement in one award produced subsequent movements in 
others.  
The synergy of these two forces produced a stereotypical Fordist dynamic. It did this so well 
that it has previously been noted that the antipodean Fordist mode of regulation ‘precociously 
enshrined’ the Fordist wage-labour nexus, proving exceedingly adept at facilitating lead 
sector flow-on and producing a compressed, relatively homogenous wage structure.35 Of the 
two elements of award rates in the post-World War II wage fixation system (the so-called 
‘Basic Wage’ and marginal payments for skill), the marginal structure was based almost 
entirely on the Metal Trades Award. When the federal arbitration tribunal determined 
marginal rates at large, it was technically only varying rates in the Metal Trades Award. 
Depending upon whether they were covered by a federal or state award, other unions would 
then apply to the appropriate arbitral tribunal to have their rates of pay moved in line with the 
metals standard. By the complicated system of relativities mentioned previously, and 
lubricated by the concept of comparative wage justice, marginal rates in the metal trades 
would filter through to the great majority of the workforce. This dynamic provided the 
motive force by which the institutional structure of Australian wage fixation turned.36 It has 
been described best by Stewart as, ‘‘the shunter’s law’ or the law of transmitted shock. An 
upward pressure is generated in one section or location in the economy and rapidly moves 
                                                          
35 Paul Frijters and Robert Gregory, ‘From Golden Age to Golden Age: Australia’s “Great Leap Forward”?,’ 
Economic Record 82(257) (2006): 207; Keith Hancock and Sue Richardson, ‘Economic and Social Effects,’ in 
The New Province for Law and Order: 100 Years of Australian Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration, ed. Joe 
Isaac and Stuart Macintyre (Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 198-199.   
36 This is to say nothing of other forces contributing to this dynamic, such as the system of test cases for 
conditions such as annual leave and the complicated processes of unions creating ‘paper’ disputes and roping 
recalcitrant employers into the coverage of certain awards. For an overview, see Andrew Stewart, Anthony 
Forsyth, Mark Irving, Richard Johnstone and Shae McCrystal, Creighton & Stewart’s Labour Law (Sydney: 
The Federation Press, 2016), 57-58.  
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with a series of successive thrusts, through other sections or territories, until its momentum 
comes to rest.’37 
To describe the juridic shape of this process, of how and over what time it crystallised, is 
what we are principally concerned with here. We see it most perfectly in a string of metal 
trades margins decisions between 1947 and 1963, tracking nicely the take-off and ascendency 
of antipodean Fordism. 
Early History 
In order to understand the landscape in which these margins decisions existed, however, it is 
salutary to quickly survey the early history of the metal trades and the Metal Trades Award. 
Whilst metal industries had existed in a more-or-less embryonic form well before Federation, 
it took the impetus of World War I, the growth of the domestic market and the advent of a 
cogent system of tariff protection to provide a kick-start to manufacturing of a more industrial 
character in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly basic metals, metal fabrication and machinery 
construction. The key metal trades unions introduced above were well-represented in the 
dramatic expansion of federal award coverage from the 1920s onwards.38 In particular, these 
unions sought ‘to standardise conditions of employment in the metal industries which were a 
key component of national industrial expansion.’39 
A moment of critical importance for the analysis here was the creation of the consolidated 
Metal Trades Award in 1930.40 Cockfield notes that, unlike the patchwork of awards which 
                                                          
37 Keith Stewart quoted in J. Hutson, Six Wage Concepts (Surry Hills: Amalgamated Engineering Union, 1971), 
142-143. 
38 See, for example, Federated Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders of Australia v Adelaide Steamship 
Company Limited (1924) 20 CAR 770; Federated Moulders (Metals) Union of Australasia v Adelaide 
Steamship Company Limited (1924) 20 CAR 890; Blacksmiths’ Society of Australasia v Adelaide Steamship 
Company Limited (1924) 20 CAR 1047; Australasian Society of Engineers v Abbotsford Manufacturing 
Company (1924) 20 CAR 1075; Federated Ironworkers Association of Australia v Mort’s Dock and 
Engineering Company Limited (1925) 22 CAR 378.   
39 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, 64 
40 Amalgamated Engineering Union v Metal Trades Employers Association (1930) 28 CAR 923.   
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had characterised the sector up to this point, the award ‘covered all occupational unions: both 
engineering unions, the blacksmiths’, boilermakers’, and moulders’ unions, the Federated 
Ironworkers Association, and the Sheet Metal Workers Union.’41 In an indication of how 
important the metals sector was even at this early stage, the tribunal stated of the case: ‘The 
interests involved, all more or less related, constitute the most important group of secondary 
industries of the Commonwealth. The industrial relationships of establishments, employing 
approximately 110,000 workers, will be affected either directly or indirectly by the award.’42 
This acknowledged significance of the metal trades industry only grew with the onset of 
World War II. Sheridan notes how ‘[t]he metal trades workforce practically doubled between 
1938-9 and 1943-4 from 177,000 to 341,000’,43 an expansion accompanied by an increasing 
scale of production, with metal workers increasingly employed in large workplaces.44 
Technological innovations, such as tungsten carbide tipped tools, new steels and improved 
machinery helped expand output vastly, whilst by 1943 domestic production of machine tools 
had increased seven times on the pre-war figure.45 These developments provided the 
foundation of a post-War metals sector of a different quantitative and qualitative magnitude 
to the one that existed before the conflict. With this industrial critical mass established, the 
metal trades sector could serve as the key site of the post-World War II flow-on system, an 
expression par excellence of a Fordist lead sector. In this context, the Metal Trades Award 
would serve as a key institutional nexus. It is to the series of key marginal wage cases that 
built this edifice between 1947 and 1963 to which we now turn. 
Margins Cases 
                                                          
41 Sandra Cockfield, ‘Arbitration, Mass Production and Workplace Relations: ‘Metal Industry’ Developments in 
the 1920s,’ Journal of Industrial Relations 35(1) (1993): 25. 
42 Amalgamated Engineering Union v Metal Trades Employers Association (1930), 927. 
43 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, 145. 
44 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, 146. 
45 Sheridan, Mindful Militants, 145. 
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As intimated above, from the 1907 Harvester decision until the 1966 Total Wage Case,46 
award rates of pay in Australia resolved themselves into two elements: a ‘Basic Wage’ that 
was professed to be calculated on a needs basis; and a margin designed initially to recognise 
the higher value of skilled labour.47 The highly important 1954 Margins Case, which 
acknowledged that most classifications in awards attracted a margin of some kind, provided a 
useful definition of the concept as  
‘…minimum amounts awarded above the basic wage to particular classifications of 
employees for the features attaching to their work which justify payments above the 
basic wage, whether those features are the skill or experience required for the 
performance of the work, its particularly laborious nature, or the disabilities attached 
to its performance.’48 
Combined with the notion of comparative wage justice elucidated previously, it is clear how 
this two-part wage structure carried latent within itself the potential for facilitating lead sector 
flow-on. If comparative wage justice was to mean anything, then margins for skill had to be 
compared between occupations and between awards, so as to ensure that people doing jobs 
with a similar skill content were being remunerated more-or-less equally. Such a system 
demands certain ‘benchmark’ occupations that can be used as a common standard throughout 
the wage structure. In a 1968 case, Commissioner O’Reilly usefully put the exercise thus: ‘It 
seems elementary that some standard or measuring rod is indispensable in any measuring 
assignment. The adequacy of any wage or salary cannot be meaningfully assessed unless it is 
considered in relation to other wages or salaries. This seems just as fundamental whether the 
                                                          
46 See respectively, Ex parte H.V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 (Harvester case); Basic Wage, Margins and Total 
Wage Cases of 1966 (1966) 115 CAR 93. 
47 Harvester (1907), 14. 
48 Amalgamated Engineering Union (Australian Section) v Metal Trades Employers Association (1954) 80 CAR 
3, 24 (‘1954 Margins Case’). 
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jobs concerned have common features or not’ (emphasis added).49 The question was what 
occupations would serve this function, and in what award would they be found. 
As early as the mid-1930s, it was becoming apparent that the Metal Trades Award might 
provide the answer to these two questions. Hancock and Richardson note that ‘[t]he tendency 
for the overall wage structure to move in line with “metals” emerged as early as 1935,’50 
although it remained the case that it wasn’t until 1947 that a consistent pattern of metal award 
dominance in marginal wage fixation emerged.51 This chronology is in perfect keeping with 
the periodisation of antipodean Fordism forwarded here, with the immediate post-World War 
II era the phase of Fordist take-off. To understand this, we must turn to the crucial 1947 
Margins Case.52 
1947 Margins Case 
The 1947 Margins Case was the platform from which the Metal Trades Award ascended to 
the apex of the post-World War II award hierarchy. It came on the back of an explosion of 
militancy after the cessation of hostilities, which was particularly pronounced in the metals 
sector. In particular, the government freezing of margins under wage-pegging regulations, 
combined with automatic indexation of the Basic Wage, meant that in nominal terms the 
relativity between skilled and unskilled employees had declined.53 Union anger at the 
maintenance of government wage controls,54 together with the success of unions in extracting 
over-award payments at the workplace level,55 combined to encourage a wave of industrial 
                                                          
49 Furnishing Trades Award, 1964 in Australian Industrial Law Review 10(32) (1968): ¶461. 
50 Hancock and Richardson, ‘Economic and Social Effects,’ 183. 
51 For example, marginal improvements gained in the metal trades in 1937 were not generally followed in other 
awards: Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners of Australia v Thomas WM Anthony (1940) 42 CAR 
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action, particularly in the manufacturing sector.56 A huge, six-month dispute in the Victorian 
metal trades erupted as metal unions, most prominently the AEU, embarked on an over-
award wage campaign.57 The employers responded with a lock-out, whilst the federal arbitral 
tribunal (at this time still the Arbitration Court)58 struggled to control an industrial brawl that 
threatened to spill over state boundaries whilst upholding the wage-fixing regulations. In the 
event, the employers and the Arbitration Court caved along the line, with a 1947 Full Bench 
Margins case59 sandwiched by two decisions of Commissioner Mooney granting substantial 
marginal increases.60 Given its enunciation of several key principles of direct relevance to the 
juridical institutionalisation of the metal award in its leading role, it is the Full Bench 
decision which directly interests us here. 
Reflecting the fact that the dispute was inextricably bound up with the continued operation of 
the Chifley Labor government’s wage-pegging scheme, the case came before the Arbitration 
Court on the basis of a reference by the Minister for Labour and National Service under the 
National Security (Industrial Peace) Regulations.61 A scan of the list of parties before the 
Court reveals that the participants were almost exclusively metal unions and associations of 
metal employers. The former included the AEU, the Blacksmiths Society of Australasia, the 
Boilermakers Society of Australia, the Federated Ironworkers Association and the Federated 
Moulders (Metals) Union of Australia.62 The latter included key associations and companies, 
such as the Australian Metal Industries Association, the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers 
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and the Metropolitan Gas Company.63 Regarding the various state and federal governments, 
the only direct representative appears to be the state government of South Australia. As we 
shall see later, this situation was to change drastically in future cases as their national 
significance was acknowledged and the Metal Trades Award was concretised as the lynchpin 
of the award structure.  
The most important element of the 1947 Margins Case in this process of concretisation was 
the attitude the Full Bench took towards the proper basis upon which to determine the money 
amounts in which margins expressed themselves. Up until this point, the circumstances to 
take into account in the fixation of margins for an industry were the circumstances of that 
industry. For example, in a 1937 case involving the Metal Trades Award, Justice Beeby 
responded to a claim for marginal rises on the basis of a general economic recovery by stating 
that ‘[s]uch evidence … is more appropriate to a basic wage inquiry and has not been 
considered in coming to a decision on the matters now before the Court. I confined my 
attention to the evidence as to this particular group of industries’ (emphasis added).64  
The 1947 Margins Case evinced a different methodology. In bringing their claims, the 
respective unions relied on two fundamental points: that the relative value of skilled work had 
declined during the war years, with the resultant relativity between skilled and unskilled work 
disturbed; and that the generally buoyant state of the economy could support the marginal 
rises claimed. In this sense, the union case was premised on factors both internal and external 
to the metal trades industry, a reality acknowledged by the Commission after the fact in 
1959.65 The Full Bench accepted the central contention of the union application, ‘that the 
highly skilled man in this industry is not receiving, and has not for some time received 
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anything like a just recompense for his skilled work’, particularly when compared to workers 
in other industries.66  
Acknowledging the specific undervaluation of metal trades work, the basis upon which the 
Court resolved the issue was of utmost importance to the juridic entrenchment of the Metal 
Trades Award as a pace-setter. Perhaps as a way of hedging their bets given the intense 
militancy of metal unions, certain employer associations made a telling argument, submitting 
that they ‘did not contend that the industry was not prosperous nor that it could not pay the 
rates the Court might, after a careful examination of the economic position not only of the 
industry but of Australia as a whole, prescribe.’67 In its methodology, the Court implicitly 
accepted this submission, demonstrated most clearly in its approach to the original Mooney 
decision: ‘We have come to the conclusion that in the present economic position of Australia 
and of the industry … it is possible to make some modification of the Mooney award, and 
that in the present circumstances we ought to do so’ (emphasis added).68 In other words, the 
Court accepted that a study of general economic conditions could be used in the assessment 
of metal trade margins, a direct refutation of Justice Beeby’s position in 1937.69 The 
identification of metal trade capacity with general economic capacity, a key moment in the 
institutionalisation of the lead sector principle, had begun.  
It is illuminating to note, however, the language of the Court regarding the potential for flow-
on. Acknowledging the ‘very special and perhaps unique circumstances’70 surrounding the 
case (that is, the massive dispute then raging in Victoria), the Court was of the opinion that 
the decision was of ‘little value as a precedent.’71 Although we will see that the federal 
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tribunal always carefully guarded its language around the application of metal trades margins 
decisions, the fact that this statement was made without qualification provides a useful point 
of reference with later cases. 
1952 Margins Case 
The 1952 Margins Case72 served as a mid-wife to the momentous 1954 decision.73 Amidst 
the backdrop of a relatively small economic slowdown,74 unions came to the Arbitration 
Court seeking marginal increases, based again on the supposed deterioration of the 
engineering fitter’s (‘the key man,’75 in the words of the Court) relative position since 1947.76 
However, the union application was also based on the claim that inflation had whittled away 
the real purchasing power of marginal payments.77 On both counts, the union parties, building 
upon the argument advanced in 1947 and in the 1950 Basic Wage case,78 explicitly put to the 
Court that the capacity of the national economy was such that marginal increases could be 
borne.79  
Before dealing with this question, however, the Court found itself grappling with some 
antecedent matters which are of immense significance for the purposes of this article. Quite 
unlike the predominantly metal-centric parties of the 1947 Margins Case, the 1952 
proceedings had the air of a national test case, reflected in the explosion of representative 
interests. Hutson notes that ‘there was a big increase in the participants to 16 metal unions, 4 
white-collar unions, 8 employer organisations, 6 individual major employers, 3 State 
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Governments, and 11 State Instrumentalities.’80 Union participants included organisations 
well-removed from the metal trades narrowly construed, including the Operative Painters and 
Decorators Union, the Operative Bricklayers, Tilers and Tuckpointers Society of South 
Australia, and the Federated Clerks Union,81 demonstrative of the fact that metal trades 
decisions were drawing within their orbit groups of workers outside of the parties represented 
in 1947.  
Even more important in the context of this case was an application for leave to intervene by 
three employer bodies: the Chamber of Manufactures of NSW, the Master Builders 
Association of Victoria, and the Timber Merchants Association of Melbourne and Suburbs. 
The argument advanced by the employer advocate, a Mr Aird, in favour of leave being 
granted is highly important to the argument of the Metal Trades Award being juridically 
implanted as a leader. It is worth exploring his submission at length: 
‘…Mr Aird submitted that all three applicants … had vast interests at stake, 
representing very many awards, both Federal and State, and a large number of 
employees, all of whom have a very immediate relationship to any movement in wage 
margins and other monetary increases which may take place in the Metal Trades 
award and which would have an effect on costs generally, but more particularly and 
importantly would percolate through (as the 1947 decision of the then Full Court had 
clearly revealed) most other awards and most other industries. He submitted that the 
main ground upon which the Unions were relying in the present case were germane 
not only to the Metal Trades award but to practically all other awards’ (emphasis 
added).82 
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Over union objections, Commissioner Galvin accepted Mr Aird’s submission, granting leave 
for all three organisations to intervene.83 Crucially, he notes, 
‘It has been said on numerous occasions … that, to an extent, the principles laid down 
in the Metal Trades Award, form the pattern for quite a large number of other awards. 
What transpired in the case of other awards subsequent to the then Full Court’s 
decision of 1947 amply bears that out, and that being so it is evident that these 
proceedings do take on something in the nature of an economic inquiry in miniature. 
In brief, the ultimate determination of this dispute is … one fraught with possible 
grave consequences not only to the Metal industry but to all industries’ (emphasis 
added).84 
This perspective represents a clear sharpening of the 1947 position, due in no small part to 
the fact that, despite the warnings of the Court that the 1947 decision had little value as a 
precedent, practice had proved otherwise.85 According to Commissioner Galvin, the 
experience from 1947 onwards had proven time and again that metal trade increases flowed 
into most other awards, often in rapid order.86  
In order to demonstrate the breadth of the process, the Commissioner drew attention to the 
fact that metal trade flow-on was not even limited to awards made under the auspices of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904.87 In particular, he noted how increases granted by the 
New South Wales Coal Industry Tribunal were modelled on the metal trades margins cases.88 
This is a key moment in the creation of the lead sector dynamic – in a federal state like 
Australia, the lead sector principle would be disrupted if the substantial state-level systems of 
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conciliation and arbitration remained immune to its pull. For this principle to be embedded, 
state arbitral tribunals would have to more-or-less follow the lead of their federal counterpart. 
Commissioner Galvin’s observation attests to this process taking place, dovetailing nicely 
with the argument forwarded in this article.89  
Commissioner Galvin also made some most useful reflections on the fact that the general 
engineering fitter, the heart of the Metal Trades Award, was becoming increasingly 
entrenched in the role of a comparative wage justice benchmark. He explains, 
‘…for many years past, first the members of the Court and later Conciliation 
Commissioners have adopted the practice of treating the rate of pay prescribed for the 
general engineering fitter as the focal point or yardstick upon which to measure the 
rates of other skilled tradesmen, and to relate thereto the services of the semi-skilled 
and unskilled classes of workers.’90 
The ‘many years past’ that Commissioner Galvin refers to is an acknowledgement that the 
engineering fitter had been used as a benchmark in some instances as early as the 1920s.91 
However, the fact that the study of this classification was increasingly carried out on the basis 
of national economic capacity took the relationship to a qualitatively higher plane. The rigid 
structure of yardsticks and comparison observed by Commissioner O’Reilly was now well 
and truly taking shape.92 
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The fact that national economic capacity and metal trade capacity was increasingly being 
treated as synonymous was evident in two different yet inter-related aspects of the judgement. 
Firstly, even a cursory glance at the very substantial economic data that was appended to the 
case (a practice not in evidence in the 1947 judgement, but followed in every subsequent 
decision discussed in this article) revealed little that was specific to the metal trades. Criteria 
such as the prosperity of industry, overseas competition and inflation were barometers of 
national economic conditions and were not related to the metal trades specifically.93 Indeed, 
Hancock notes that considerations of the macroeconomic impact of marginal adjustments 
were the determining factors.94 Secondly, and seemingly paradoxically, was the new, and at 
this stage fairly rudimentary, attempt of metal unions to use evidence of existing over-award 
payments as evidence of the capacity of employers to bear the cost of marginal increases.95 
Both attest to the conceptual distinction between the passive and active facets of the lead 
sector principle discussed above. Whilst the use of national economic capacity in assessing 
metal margins was an acknowledgment of its de facto pace-setting role, the goal of metal 
unions to use over-award payments as a criterion for awarding economy-wide marginal rises 
represented a more activist attempt to exploit this dynamic. If over-award payments could be 
adduced as evidence in favour of granting marginal increases, there was no better industry to 
use as the model than the metals sector. Metal unions like the AEU were characterised by 
strong rank-and-file organisation and a ready willingness to apply industrial duress at the 
plant-level to extract and maintain over-award payments.96 Combined with the fact that 
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metals was at the heart of the vibrant post-War manufacturing sector, characterised by very 
high levels of productivity, utilisation of capacity and a contribution to GDP and employment 
that was waxing in the late 1950s and early 1960s,97 such over-award payments would almost 
certainly have been higher than what could be gained in other parts of the economy.  
In the event, Commissioner Galvin rejected the union argument,98 claiming amongst other 
things that over-award payments obtained by duress in a tight labour market could not be 
used as a reliable guide to what could be regarded as fair and reasonable rates.99 This positive 
facet of the lead sector principle would, to the extent it received expression, have to wait until 
later cases. 
1954 Margins Case 
The 1954 Margins Case was a watershed moment in the juridical crystallisation of the Metal 
Trades Award in its pace-setting role. Largely repeating their argument in the 1952 case, the 
union applicants came to the Court asking for marginal improvements to correct the 
deteriorating position of the relatively skilled employee on the grounds of national economic 
capacity. Once again, the process was carried out with the panoply of a national test case, 
reflected in the diverse nature of the parties making submissions to it. In particular, all the 
states bar New South Wales and Queensland were now directly represented in the 
proceedings, whilst even local-level governments, such as Melbourne City Council, were 
becoming involved.100 
                                                          
97 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Year Book Australia (Canberra: 1960), 161; Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2001 (Canberra: 2001), 712; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year 
Book Australia 2012 (Canberra: 2012), 510.   
98 On precisely the grounds of national economic capacity, he actually refused to award any general increase in 
margins, due largely to the aforementioned economic slowdown: 1952 Margins Case, 363-364.  
99 1952 Margins Case, 355-356. 
100 1954 Margins Case, 5-6. 
25 
  
1954 marked a qualitative evolution in at least two senses: firstly, the Court explicitly 
registered the fact that the Metal Trades Award was determinative for margins fixation in a 
great many cases; secondly, it represented a qualitative extension of the 1947 and 1952 cases 
by expressly identifying the capacity of the national economy with the capacity of the metal 
trades and vice versa.  
Turning to the first of these, the Court, although employing its usual guarded language, as 
good as accepted as fact that any increases granted in metal trade margins would find 
expression in awards throughout the wage structure. In talking about the guidance other 
wage-fixing authorities were to derive from their decision to increase margins generally, the 
Court stated that ‘…we are aware not only that our decision in this case establishes a new and 
higher standard of margins for skilled employees covered by the Metal Trades award, but 
also that successive awards in this industry have in the past been regarded as guides for 
margins in a number of other awards.’101 Earlier in the judgment it also noted of the skilled 
tradesman that ‘any increase in his margin is likely to have some reflection in the marginal 
rates of other skilled employees not in this industry.’102 Unlike the 1947 case, where it was 
stated that the decision was to apply only to the metal industries and had little value as a 
precedent,103 the Court here fully acknowledged the fact that in determining metal margins it 
was effectively determining them for the greater part of the labour force and that, to the 
extent that the purchasing power of money was an operative factor in the decision, it was of 
more-or-less general application.104 To that end, in a highly important note on the 
implementation of the decision, the Court discussed how it should be applied to awards with 
historical nexus to the Metal Trades Award and awards not so linked.105 Such a statement is 
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an acknowledgment and affirmation of the pace-setting function of the metal trades, the 
clearest we have thus far. 
Regarding the second point, the Court made the full transition towards using national 
economic capacity as the primary consideration in granting metal margin increases. This was 
a fact acknowledged by the Commission itself in 1959:  
‘It was not until 1954 that the Court considered only the capacity of industry generally 
and did not concern itself with the capacity of the Metal Trades industry as such. It 
must be borne in mind that in the 1954 Metal Trades case the Court proceeded to lay 
down a formula intended, generally speaking, for all industry.’106 
This shift was reflected in the ever greater volume and diversity of national economic data 
marshalled in order to ascertain the capacity of the economy to sustain marginal increases. 
The Court gathered information on indicators such as employment, investment, production 
and productivity, overseas trade and balances and the competitive position of secondary 
industry and the retail trade.107 Whilst some of these obviously bore a substantial connection 
to the metal trades e.g. the competitive position of secondary industry, others, such as figures 
on rural production, were at best tangentially related.108  
In the sense of juridically acknowledging and institutionalising the pace-setting role of the 
Metal Trades Award, therefore, the 1954 Margins Case was momentous. The methodology 
espoused involved a global survey of the national economy to identify the capacity of the 
economy to handle marginal increases. Once that capacity had been ascertained, the 
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principles of comparative wage-justice and the benchmarking of key occupations like the 
general engineering fitter ensured that the margins thus determined flowed through the award 
structure at large, an eventuality the Court accepted and provided for. The case, whilst 
building on the 1947 and 1952 decisions, represented a hitherto unprecedented entrenchment 
of the Metal Trades Award at the pinnacle of the award structure. The capacity of the metal 
trades and the capacity of the national economy were regarded as synonymous, a pure 
expression of the passive facet of the lead sector principle. As the Court accepted that 
whatever was achieved in the metal trades would percolate through other industries, it was 
logical that the state of the macro-economy should be the prime criterion for metal margins. 
The fact that this position of metal sector paramountcy was buttressed by powerful and 
generally militant metal unions ensured that their wage and conditions gains found ready-
made institutional channels through which to diffuse. The PRA conception of a lead sector as 
necessary to the coherence of Fordism therefore finds clear expression in the 1954 Margins 
case. As Fordism shifted from its post-War take-off phase to its period of coherence in the 
1950s-1960s, the juridical institutionalisation of the Metal Trades Award as a pace-setter 
intensified. The idea of law as a constituent juridic form of capitalism, as opposed to an 
epiphenomenal superstructure, tells us that this process of intensification was not merely 
reactive, but indeed played a part in crystallising the lead sector principle, a reality we see 
demonstrated explicitly in the 1954 decision.  
It is significant to note in passing that the union attempt to press a more active lead sector 
dynamic was, as in 1952, rebuffed by the Court. In particular, evidence adduced as to the 
prevalence of over-award payments found little traction with the Court, which, echoing its 
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1952 judgement, argued that over-awards (often achieved through industrial duress) were not 
a sound basis on which to assess the true value of work performed.109 
1959 Margins Case 
The 1959 Margins Case was the first held before the reconstituted Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, formed as a result of the 1956 Boilermakers 
decision.110 As suggested previously, the case acted as something of a retrospective for the 
new Commission, which surveyed the development of metal margins cases from 1937 
onwards, noting the movement from industry-specific capacity to general economic capacity 
as the prime criterion in the fixation of marginal rates.111 In short, the Commission identified 
and acknowledged that the Metal Trades Award was entrenched in its pace-setting role, and 
that the Court/Commission was cognisant of this fact in reaching its decisions. Reaffirming 
the crux of the 1952 and 1954 decisions, it stated ‘[t]hat in considering the question of 
margins generally, the Commission must have regard to the capacity of industry as a whole to 
meet any increases sought…’, a lucid expression of the content of the lead sector principle in 
its passive aspect.112 
The 1959 decision did, however, see a significant qualification introduced into the 
relationship between general economic capacity and the capacity of particular industrial 
sectors. The case involved the Commission looking to two related but conceptually distinct 
issues – the question of metal margins generally; and the question of margins in the specific 
instance of the Gold and Metalliferous Mining Award.113 In the context of the latter, the 
Commission seemingly retreated a step from the 1954 position, noting that ‘[w]e do not think 
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it could be said that the economic capacity of a particular industry could not be relevant in a 
particular case. If an industry has greater or less capacity at a particular point of time than the 
economy generally, then that may be a factor proper to take into account in fixing the 
margins for that industry.’114  
On the face of it, this seems to see the Commission return to the 1947 position, taking into 
account the capacity of both the national economy and the metal trades industry in fixing 
metal margins, and thus compromising the lead sector principle. However, this was not so, as 
we can deduce from one highly significant passage: ‘We would add that in all the matters 
now before us, no distinction was draw between the capacity of the economy as a whole and 
the capacity of the particular industries in question, except insofar as that capacity may have 
been incidentally involved in the question of over-award payments alleged to exist in those 
industries.’115 
This statement of the Commission reveals two key planks which ensured the maintenance, 
and perhaps intensification, of the pace-setting role of the Metal Trades Award. Firstly, given 
its historic role and the immense difficulties in quantifying capacity in different sectors of the 
economy,116 there was no thoroughgoing effort to distinguish between the capacity of the 
metal trades and that of the national economy. Not by accident, the former was taken as 
synonymous with the latter, as reflected in the voluminous economic data appended to the 
judgement which, like preceding cases, was generally related to the metal trades only in an 
indirect fashion.117 Secondly, unlike the previous cases where evidence of over-award 
payments in the metal trades was rejected out of hand as a guide to marginal fixation, the 
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Commission in this case proved more conceptually receptive to including such measures. As 
noted above, it commented that, in the distinction between metal trade and national economic 
capacity, none was drawn ‘except insofar as that capacity may have been incidentally 
involved in the question of over-award payments alleged to exist in those industries’118 
(‘those industries’ being the metal trades). Whilst such a development was in a sense a logical 
consequence of the Commission’s qualification of the 1954 a priori identity of metal trade 
and national economic capacity, the aforementioned difficulty in distinguishing between the 
two opened the possibility that measures appropriate to the former could bleed into 
calculations of the latter. In some ways this can thus be seen as an intensification of the active 
sense of the lead sector principle, whereby evidence of higher capacity and productivity in 
the metal industries could enter into the calculation of marginal rates for all industries.  
1963 Margins Case 
The 1963 Margins Case119 has been described as ‘the institutional highpoint of the Metal 
Trades Award.’120 This was so both logically and historically. Like its forebears after 1947, a 
very diverse group of organisations were represented before the Commission, ranging from a 
collection of state governments, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, the Graziers 
Association of New South Wales, the Hydro Electric Commission of Tasmania, along with 
the more traditional metal unions and metal employer associations.121 Once again, the 
Commission sifted through a very substantial body of data as to the state of the Australian 
economy, including indicators relating to rural industry, the balance of payments, the 
competitive position of secondary industry, investment, employment, company income, and 
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money, banking and retail trade.122 The Commission thus clearly continued in its approach of 
constructing metal trades margins on the basis of national economic data, reflective of the 
entrenched juridic understanding of the leading role of the metals sector.  
The Commission did reiterate the qualification introduced in 1959 regarding the conceptual 
distinction between metal trade and national economic capacity, stating in particular that ‘[i]n 
our view it is proper in considering whether real margins should be increased in this award to 
ascertain if there has been any increase in economic capacity in the Metal Trades industry 
and if that increase has occurred in the context of increased capacity in industry generally.’123 
It is worth quoting the Commission’s answer to this question at length, as in it lies the 
synergy between the active and passive facets of the lead sector principle established in 1959: 
‘It was not suggested by the employers that the economic capacity of the Metal 
Trades industry is less than industry generally or that increases in productivity in the 
Metal Trades industry have been or will be less than increases in national 
productivity. In light of this fact and taking into account over-award payments and 
working hours, we are prepared to assume in the unions’ favour that by and large the 
economic capacity of the Metal Trades industry is certainly not less than and probably 
more than that of industry generally’ (emphasis added).124 
As was the case in 1959, the Commission appeared more willing to take into account factors 
going to metal trades capacity, like over-award payments and working hours, at the same 
time that unions made a greater effort to survey and quantify such factors.125 The fact that the 
metal trades industries were characterised by strong shopfloor organisation, allowing the 
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extraction of sizeable over-award sums in many workplaces,126 is indicative precisely of the 
active sense of a lead sector, given that such sums were often obtained by industrial duress 
without a necessary relationship to the strict capacity of the employer to pay.  
As mentioned previously, the 1963 Margins Case represents the institutional highpoint of the 
Metal Trades Award. Although conceptually distinct, the capacity of the metal trades and the 
economy generally were in practice unified. The industrial capacity of the nation was thus 
refracted through the prism of the Metal Trades Award; once so refracted, marginal increases 
in the metal award would flow through the award structure, lubricated by the ideology of 
comparative wage justice and the benchmarking role of certain occupations like the general 
engineering fitter.  
Conclusions 
In this article we have traced the ascension of the Metal Trades Award to the apex of the 
post-World War II award structure over a series of key decisions regarding marginal fixation 
between 1947 and 1963. Building on inchoate steps in the mid to late 1930s and inheriting a 
metal trades industry exponentially more developed as a result of the War, the 1947 Margins 
Case was the crucial departure point for this ascent, in that the then-Arbitration Court 
explicitly recognised that the fixation of metal margins would have an impact on national 
wage levels. The Court thus felt compelled to take into account the likely impact of increased 
margins on the economy broadly.  
The fact that these higher margins quickly filtered into other awards covering a whole range 
of industries forced the Court in 1952 to acknowledge the fact that the metal trades industry 
was a lead sector in the strict sense – what happened there regarding wages and conditions 
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would quickly find expression in the award structure at large, diffused by the notion of 
comparative wage justice of equal pay for those doing the same work regardless of the 
industry in which they worked.127 The diversification of parties intervening in margins cases, 
the consultation of detailed and wide-ranging economic data going to national conditions, the 
awareness of the fact that the general engineering fitter was an elemental industrial measuring 
rod – these were all juridic reflections of the crystallisation of the lead sector role of the metal 
trades. The Commission’s decision in 1954 to take metal trade and national economic 
capacity as synonymous was perhaps the purest expression of this principle in its passive 
sense; if metal trades margins affected the wage structure at large, then it made sense that the 
criteria on which those margins were fixed were national in character.  
Subsequent decisions in 1959 and 1963, whilst qualifying somewhat the 1954 position, 
nevertheless assumed very easily a functional identity between the capacity of the metal 
industry and the national economy; certainly the parties to the cases made very little 
distinction between the two. Given this identity, the fact that the Commission proved more 
receptive to union surveys relating to over-award payments and overtime worked in the metal 
industry potentially intensified the active facet of the lead sector principle, in terms of 
diffusing above average capacity to other industries.  
This article demonstrates the fundamental soundness of both the regulationist periodisation of 
post-World War II Australian capitalism and the synergy of the PRA with a theory of juridic 
forms. Key to the coherence of the ideal-typical Fordist model of development is a lead 
sector, from whence is derived the dynamic of wage and conditions diffusion that powers its 
intensive accumulation regime. The understanding of law as being a constituent, as opposed 
to casual, factor in the fabric of a model of development tells us that the generation of this 
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lead sector principle cannot help but have a legal character. The foregoing analysis quite 
clearly shows this process at play. In the take-off and ascendant phase of antipodean Fordism, 
the federal arbitration tribunal (in its various incarnations) juridically implanted the lead 
sector principle, crystallised in the Metal Trades Award. The system it created, waxing in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, would survive the attempts of restive employers to destroy it 
through the Total Wage128 and Work Value129 cases of 1966 and 1967. Although the entire 
wage structure and its industrial relations institutions proved increasingly dysfunctional as the 
crisis of the early 1970s took hold, it would take the enforced wage restraint of the Accord in 
the 1980s and the movement to enterprise bargaining in the 1990s to destroy the entrenched 
position of the metal award as a pace-setter.130 
In terms of future research, there are a number of fronts along which the current analysis 
could be advanced. This species of historical political economy of metal trade decisions has, 
to be the best of the author’s knowledge, not been attempted by others. Therefore, this article 
has focused on a close technical analysis of the key marginal decisions, both to create a 
general chronology and to elucidate some of the finer details and nuances of the tribunal’s 
approach. Given the generally guarded and qualified language the Commission used, such a 
close textual analysis is both necessary and illuminating. However, in concentrating on the 
formal judgements as entered in the Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, we have neglected 
in this instance to look at the case transcripts. Such a task would be immense, and is well 
beyond the parameters of this article. By way of illustration, Commissioner Galvin noted that 
the transcript for the 1952 proceedings ran to 3,986 pages!131 There can be no doubt, 
however, that studying the transcripts would introduce a much finer granularity into the 
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account, particularly insofar as it would reveal the attitudes and understandings of the parties 
and interveners in much greater detail. Whilst this article has dealt with how the Commission 
came to understand the history of metal trade fixation and its functions in that regard, it 
would be equally profitable to investigate how various unions, employers and employer 
associations, and state and federal governments approached the same questions. Additionally, 
the transcripts would reveal the detailed evidence presented in margins cases regarding the 
marginal rates paid to different classifications within the Metal Trades Award. Aside from the 
obvious utility in further concretising the marginal wage fixation process, such evidence 
would also be invaluable in documenting the evolution of the labour process in the metal 
industries. 
Another line of inquiry would be to focus on derivative marginal adjustments in awards 
linked to the Metal Trades Award through historical nexus and comparative wage justice 
claims. This would give a much more detailed picture of how the Commission actually 
effected metal trade flow-on. Such a study could reveal whether or not such flow-on                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
occurred unquestioningly as a matter of course, or whether the Commission was willing to 
modulate the application of such flow given the circumstances of particular industries. This 
would be particularly important from 1959 onwards, given the qualification introduced in the 
margins case of that year. 
Lastly, it would be both fascinating and highly instructive to understand how the Australian 
experience of lead sector institutionalisation compares to that of other Fordist societies. As 
previously mentioned, the pace-setting role of the metal trades sector in Australia has 
analogues in other advanced capitalist states, such as automobile manufacturing in the USA 
and steelworkers in Sweden. Understanding the nature of the juridical and political 
institutions implanting and entrenching the lead sector principle cuts to the heart of the 
architecture of Fordism in its diverse national instantiations. As the author has argued 
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elsewhere, the fact that the leading role of the metal trades in Australia was enshrined in the 
vehicle of the Metal Trades Award and the award system gave a distinct character to the ways 
in which Australian capitalism attempted to escape the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s.132 The 
unique lead sector arrangements of other Fordist societies would also impart their own 
dynamic and temporality to the processes of crisis resolution. In an era of deep political and 
economic change, such as we are currently experiencing, a better understanding of the 
structure of Fordism, of how that structure came apart and how it birthed neoliberalism, is not 
merely of academic interest. It can instead highlight the opportunities and pitfalls presented 
by the profound malaise of contemporary capitalism to those who would fight for a fairer 
society. 
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